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August, 1954
THE INVESTIGATING POWER OF CONGRESS:
ITS SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
JOSEPH F. DOLAN of the Denver Bar*
The United States Supreme Court, in its most recent opinion
dealing with the subject of the investigating power of Congress,
said: "There is wide concern both in and out of Congress, over
some aspects of the exercise of the Congressional power of in-
vestigation."' The statement was not an exaggerated one when
made. If made today, it would be an understatement of considerable
proportions.
Even the less perceptive observers of the American political
scene must by now be aware that Congressional investigations are
a subject about which almost everyone has an opinion. As is the
case with other aspects of the political world, much of the opinion
is based upon emotion and instinct rather than upon intellect. Lay-
men and lawyers alike praise, condone, and condemn committees,
committee chiairmen, committee procedures, etc., frequently with-
out recourse to any of the available facts. In the recent Zwicker
incident,2 millions had opinions, yet probably not more than one in
ten thousand read the transcript of the hearing and not one in a
hundred thousand took the time to inform himself of the legal is-
sues involved. It is therefore fitting and proper that, in the midst
of the turbulence and turmoil of political strife, we pause to con-
sider just what it is all about.
THE BACKGROUND
The subject of Congressional investigating power has been
considered extensively in legal literature. 3 This is not the first time
in our history that such investigations have been the subject of
*Mr. Dolan served as Chief Counsel to the U. S. House Select Committee on
Lobbying Activities in 1950; he also served as Liaison Representative of the
Executive Branch of Government with the same Committee.
'U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953).
- See Hearings before Senate Committee on Government Operations, Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations, 83d Congress, 2d Sess. (1954).
'Leading works include:
Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investi-
gation, 40 HARv. L. REV. 153 (1926).
Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 691 (1926).
McGeary, Development of Congressional Investigative Power, (1940).
See also Congressional Investigations: A Symposium, 18 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
421-661 (1951).
For analyses and criticisms of the work of particular committees, see:
Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities Committee, 47
COLUMBIA L. REV. 416 (1947); 'Investigating Powers of the House Un-American
Activities Committee, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 565 (1948); The Un-American Activities
Committee, 18 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 598 (1951); Senate Preparedness Subcommit-
tee. 18 U. OF CHi. L. REV. 634 (1951); House Select Committee on Lobbying Ac-
tivities, 18 U. OF Cri. L. REV. 647 (1951); and Subcommittee on Monopoly
Poirer of the House Judiciary Committee. 18 U. OF Cir. L. REV. 658 (1951).
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widespread derogatory comment. Criticism has been sharp at times
in the past,4 but in general the legal writers have indicated a de-
sire to have the scope and limitations of the power determined by
principles of law rather than by a desire to clip the wings of some
transient demagogue who happens to be flitting across the Ameri-
can political scene.
Congressional investigations have a long and tempestuous his-
tory in the United States.- One of the first recorded legislative in-
vestigations in the United States was that by the House of Repre-
sentatives into General St. Clair's disaster in the Northwest Terri-
tory in 1792.6
The Constitution makes no provision for Congressional in-
vestigations. The English parliament and colonial legislatures,
however, exercised investigatory powers before the adoption of our
own Constitution ;7 and the Congress possesses an inherent power
to investigate to aid in the discharge of its legislative function
under a tri-partite system of government. The U. S. Constitution
gives Congress the power to legislate s The U. S. Code contains
several sections which are based on an assumed inherent legisla-
tive power to investigate. Provision is made for administration of
oaths to witnesses 9, and for refusal of witnesses to testify."'
4 See Wigmore, Legislative Power to Compel Testimonial Disclosure, 19 ILL.
L. REV. 452 (1925), where the Teapot Dome investigation is described thus:
The Senatorial debauch of investigations . . . poking into political
garbage cans and dragging the sewers of political intrigue . . . filled
the winter . . . with a stench which has not yet passed away . . . the
Senate . . . fell . . . in popular estimate to the level of professional
searchers of the municipal dunghills...
.For an excellent thorough historical summary, see Landis, op cit. supra
note 3. See also Congressional Investigations, 41 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 618 (1951); and Galloway, The Investigative Function o1 Congress,
21Aw. PoL. Sci. Rev. 47 (1927).
'Annals of Cong. 490 (1792).
'Landis, op cit. supra note 3 at 159; Fields v. U. S. (App. D. C. 1947) 164
F2d 97, 99, cert. den., 332 U. S. 851 (1948).
8U. S. CONST. Art. I § 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives."
'§ 191 Oaths to witnesses
The President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives, or a chairman of any joint committee established by a joint
or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or of a com-
mittee of the whole, or of any committee of either House of Congress,
is empowered to administer oaths to witnesses in any case under their
examination.
Any member of either House of Congress may administer oaths to
witnesses in any matter depending in either House of Congress of which
he is a Member, or any committee thereof. Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. §191.
"§192 Refusal of witness to testify
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the au-
thority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce
papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any
joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the
two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress,
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Congressional investigations first began to capture the pub-
lic's imagination in the period following the Civil War, and the in-
creased power and influence of the press was a not insignificant
factor in the change. The controversial, front-page investigation
which arouses public indignation-sometimes against the investi-
gators, sometimes against the investigated-has been said to have
been "created by the press-the press has been its power and its
undoing.""
From time to time Congress passes statutes which require dis-
closure of facts it deems necessary to assist it in legislating, like
the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and the Federal Lobbying Act.
12
The right of Congress to do so has been upheld by the Courts.
3
But these statutes are only a small part of the investigative func-
tion of the Congress. By far the biggest proportion of the power
is manifested by inquiries conducted by the Houses of Congress
themselves, or by Committees thereof.
The legislative inquiry has been described as "the logical con-
comitant and indispensable subsidiary of the legislative powers
[whose place] has never been seriously challenged and the Supreme
Court, with one notable exception, has shown a wise and under-
standable reluctance to interfere with or impose significant limita-
tions upon the Congress in the use of this legislative tool.
'14
Congressional investigations may be carried out by permanent
("standing") committees or by temporary ("select") committees.
In the former case, the chairman is invariably picked on the basis
of seniority in the majority party and tenure on the Committee. In
the latter case, custom dictates that the member who introduced
the resolution creating the committee shall be its chairman. In
general, controversy has centered more on the activities of select
committees. This may well be because select committees "enable
young and energetic members to sidestep the seniority custom, to
employ expert and zealous personnel, and to conduct vigorous and
searching investigations into vital public questions."'15
willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any
question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000
nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less
than one month nor more than twelve months. 52 Stat. 942. 2 U.S.C.
§192.
11 Congressional Investigations, 38 GEO. L. J. 343 (1950).
"The Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 43 Stat. 1070, 2 U.S.C. §§241-256; The
Federal Lobbying Act, 60 Stat. 842, 2 U.S.C. §§261-270.
3Burroughs v. U. S., 290 U. S. 534 (1934), sustaining the Corrupt Prac-
tices Act; U. S. v. Harriss, - U. S., - (1954), 98 L. Ed. 661, June 21, 19.54, sus-
taining the Federal Lobbying Act.
14Keele, Note on Congressional Investigations, 40 A.B.A.J. 154 (1954). The
exception is stated to be Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
Galloway, Congress in Action, 28 NEB. L, REv. 493 (1949). The seniority
custom usually requires many years of legislative service before a member be-
comes a Chairman. The Junior Senator from Wisconsin was able to become
Chairman of a standing Committee after only five years of service principally
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Two of the present members of the United States Supreme
Court are on record for strong Congressional investigating power.
Justice Black has stated: "There is no power on earth that can tear
away the veil behind which operate powerful and audacious and un-
scrupulous groups save the sovereign legislative power armed with
the right of subpoena and search." 16 Back in another period of
criticism of Congressional investigations, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said: ". . . the procedure of Congressional investigation should re-
main as it is. No limitation should be imposed by Congressional
legislation or standing rules. The power of investigation should be
left untrammelled, and the methods and form of each investigation
should be left for determination of Congress and its Committees,
as each situation arises.' '1 7
The problem is not exclusively an American one. Legislative
power of inquiry exists to varying degrees in other nations of the
world, but only in France has it achieved the controversial status
before the public that it has in America. 8
The number of Congressional inquiries here in America has
increased in recent years,' 9 as has the amount of public interest in
them. The advent of television, more than any other single factor,
has brought the entire legislative process closer to all of the people;
and it is likely that public interest will continue to wax strong.
THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATING POWER
The Congressional power of investigation is limited to mat-
ters reasonably pertinent to an inquiry which bears a reasonable
relationship to a subject as to which Congress may validly legis-
late.2 0 Investigations must be in aid of a legislative purpose. How-
ever, a bona fide legislative purpose will be presumed. 21 The pre-
sumption is probably conclusive.2 2
Congress may investigate to determine qualifications of its
members, or circumstances surrounding their elections, both gen-
eral and primary.2 3 The inquiry may be directed toward establish-
because the Committee in question was created, just prior to his election, by
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Members of the Senate with greater
seniority chose Committee assignments then considered to be of greater im-
portance.
16Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 HARPERs 275, 276 (1936).
"Hands Of f the Investigations, 38 NEW REPUBLIC 329, 331 (1924).
IsFor an interesting commentary on the practical effects of lack of strong
investigative powers in foreign legislatures, see Ehrmann, The Duty of Dis-
closure in Parliamentary Investigation: A Comparative Study, 11 U. OF CHI.
L. REV. 1 (1943) and 117 (1944).
19It has been estimated that the 82d Congress alone appropriated $5,700,000
for 236 special investigations. 10 Congressional Quarterly 941 (1953).
"0McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
21 In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S.
135 (1927).
.=See U.S. v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
'Reed v. County Commissioners, 277 U. S. 376 (1928); U. S. v. Norris,
300 U. S. 564 (1937).
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ment of facts on which to base an impeachment proceeding,2 4 or
expulsion or censure of a member.25 The investigation may concern
itself with the administration of a portion of the executive branch
of the Government, 6 and use or misuse of appropriated funds.27
Although much has been written and said about the "inform-
ing function of Congress, '28 there has not been any judicial ruling
upholding an investigation solely on that basis.29 As long as the
presently recognized broad scope of legislative purpose remains,
the question will almost certainly continue to be an academic one.3 0
4Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 at 190 (1880).
"In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897).
11 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927). This power is accepted by
all writers on the subject.
" Innumerable investigations of the executive branch have been conducted
on this basis. Query, would a similar investigation of the judicial branch be
valid?
1 See WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT, 303 (15th Ed., 1913) where it
is stated that this function is more important than the legislative function.
While the latter could exist without the former, it is difficult to see how the
former could exist without the latter. In the recent case of U. S. v. Rumely,
345 U. S. 41 (1953), noted elsewhere herein, the court, per Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, quoted the following excerpt from "Congressional Government" as an
example of the "reach that may be claimed" for the investigative power of
Congress:
It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees.
It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom
and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every
means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the
administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless
to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize
these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country
must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs
which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The
informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legis-
lative function. (Emphasis added).
The same quotation has more recently been set forth in the annual report
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, made by its Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. The Subcommittee, chairmaned by Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy and guided by Chief Counsel Roy M. Cohn, states that the
Wilson quote was "cited by the Supreme Court in U. S. v. Rumeley (sic)."
' See dictum in Electric Bond and Share Co. v. S.E.C., 303 U. S. 419, at 437
(1938). In McGrain v. Daugherty the court said that "the only legitimate ob-
ject the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in legis-
ating." 273 U. S. 135, 177 (1927).
30 The question could conceivably arise out of a practice of some con-
temporary investigating committees. A witness is called before the committee
in executive session, away from the prying of the press and the public. The
witness answers some questions of Committee Counsel, refuses to answer others.
Some of the questioning is adjudged by the Committee Chairman to be valuable
in furthering his personal ambitions, and some testimony does not meet that
test. The witness is then called before a public session, same Committee, same
Chairman, same Counsel. Only the questioning which is to the Chairman's self-
presumed advantage is repeated. The witness refuses to answer and is cited
for contempt. The questions were pertinent to a legislative purpose, and no
constitutional question of privilege, freedom of speech, etc., was raised. May
the witness be convicted of contempt based exclusively on the public refusal?
Some writers on the subject would apparently answer yes, as they have
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Some legislative investigations are undoubtedly carried on for
reasons of political aggrandizement, personal or party, but such a
purpose provides no legal basis for an investigation.
The development and effective use of the Congressional in-
vestigation has been acclaimed as the best method of restoring the
balance of separate government powers.31 Legislative investigations
provide the best method by which the Congress can learn the facts
necessary to an intelligent determination of what legislation is
needed and what legislation is not needed. A former President of
the United States has declared:
... the power of investigation is one of the most im-
portant powers of the Congress. The manner in which
that power is exercised will largely determine the posi-
tion and prestige of the Congress in the future. An in-
formed Congress is a wise Congress; an uninformed Con-
gress surely will forfeit a large portion of the respect and
confidence of the people.
3 2
Congress may investigate over a wide range of subject matters
in furtherance of a legislative purpose. It appears that Congress
may validly investigate in areas where its power to legislate is
limited. 33 But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas
(in which Justice Black concurred) in U. S. v. Rumely where it is
stated that inquiry is precluded into "any matter in respect to
which no valid legislation could be had. '34 Those who assert that
asserted that investigating committees have free scope of inquiry merely to
bring facts to the public attention. See McGeary, op. cit. supra notes 3 at 104;
Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee, 33 COL. L. REV.
4 at 6 (1933) ; Ehrmann, op cit. supra note 18. It is submitted that legislative
purposes have been served by the executive session, and that a contempt cita-
tion based solely on the public testimony would not be valid.
"Meader, Limitations on Congressional Investigation, 47 MIcH. L. REV.
775 (1949).
3o Senator Harry S. Truman, 90 Cong. Rec. 6747 (Aug. 7, 1944).
See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 (1946);
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U. S. 501 (1943); I.C.C. v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U. S. 194 (1912). In the Oklahoma Press Publishing case it was
held that the First Amendment did not preclude a subpoena by an administra-
tive official requiring a newspaper to disclose the interstate distribution of its
paper, dissemination of its news, or the source of its advertising receipts. In
the I.C.C. case it was stated that ". . . requiring . . . information concerning a
business is not regulation of that business . . ." In the Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing case the court brought under consideration the power of Congress itself to
investigate, although the actions of an administrative agency were being ques-
tioned, stating:
For to deny the validity of the orders would be in effect to deny
not only Congress' power to enact the provisions sustaining them, but
also its authority to delegate effective power to investigate violations of
its own laws, if not perhaps also its own power to make such investiga-
tions.
-1345 U. S. 41 (1953), citing Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 194, 195
(1880); and McGrain v. Daugherty 273 U. S. 135, 171 (1927).
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Congress may inquire only in fields in which it may validly legis-
late overlook the fact that if this were the case, the existence or
non-existence of the power to inquire could often be determined only
by an inquiry itself .34a
If it is ever held that Congress may not investigate except in
fields where it may validly legislate, it may become pertinent to as-
certain whether the Congressional power to propose amendments 35
enlarges its power of investigation. To date, the matter has not
been adjudicated. Law review writers frequently cite a British
case on the subject,36 which answered in the negative as to the
Australian Constitution.
The investigating power of Congress may be likened to the
broad powers of a Grand Jury, where successful challenges to
power are few and far between. 37 It will thus be seen that the
scope of the investigative power of Congress is broad indeed, and
necessarily so. The legislative function encompasses decisions to
enact laws, but it includes more. It also necessarily includes the
power to decide what laws not to enact, and the gathering of infor-
mation necessary to make such determinations. This is a broad
assignment and requires broad powers for its proper discharge.
It is often asserted that Congress may not compel any testi-
mony with respect to matters of opinion or belief, religious, po-
litical, economic, or otherwise.38 It must be remembered, however,
that questions may legitimately be asked relating to acts of an indi-
vidual which may incidentally touch upon a person's beliefs.
3 9
When such beliefs also involve some other interest into which the
Congress may legitimately inquire, the public purpose must and
will override the private belief. Purely personal private affairs
into which Congress may not pry40 are no longer personal when
they become pertinent to a Congressional inquiry.
41
Congress need not specify what sort of legislation, if any, is
expected to come from a committee in order to validate its in-
'" See the hypothetical situation outlined in Morgan, Congressional In-
vestigations and Judicial Reviews: Kilbourn v. Thompson Revisited, 37 CALIF.
L. REV. 556 (1949).
M U. S. CONST., Art. V. "The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses
shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . ."
'Attorney-General v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co. (1914) A.C. 233 (P.C.
1913).
"7 Some grand jury powers are described in Blair v. U. S., 250 U. S. 273, 282
(1919), which, significantly, was cited with approval in the Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. case.
"See Boudin, Congressional and Agency Investigations: Their Uses and
Abuses, 35 VA. L. REV. 143 (1949).
*"Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?"
The propriety of this question has been sustained by the courts. Barsky v. U. S.,
167 F2d 241 (C.A.D.C., 1948) ; cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
" Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
" McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); U. S. v. Barsky, 167 F2d
241 (C.A.D.C., 1948), cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
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quiries.4 2 Nor is it of any significance that no legislation has re-
sulted from the Committee's work.42 It is enough that there is a
mere possibility that some legislation will result, and it is imma-
terial that invalid as well as valid legislation may stem from the
investigation.
44
Those who would further restrict the investigating power of
Congress invariably cite Kilbourn v. Thompson,45 which has been
described as the "low water mark of the Congressional power of
investigation. ' 4 Kilbourn v. Thompson has been criticized by the
United States Supreme Court for its "loose language," and note
has been made of "the weighty criticism to which it has been sub-
jected" and the "inroads that have been made upon it by later
cases."
47
APPLICABILITY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
First Amendment
The First Amendment to the U. S. Constitution 4 has not been
successfully asserted to date as a valid reason for refusing to
answer questions or to produce papers for a Congressional investi-
gation. Either of two of the provisions of the First Amendment
might be cited as grounds for refusal:
(1) freedom of speech, or
(2) freedom of the press.
A recent attack on a prosecution for contempt of Congress al-
leged a violation of this Amendment and failed.
49
At least one witness has been cited for contempt for refusing
to answer questions of a Congressional committee solely on the
grounds of protection allegedly afforded by the First Amendment. 0
The basis of such a refusal has been severely criticized as "a me-
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927); In re Chapman, 166 U. S.
661 (1897).
1 Townsend v. U. S., 95 F2d 352 (C.A.D.C., 1938) ; cert. den., 303 U. S.
664 (1948).
44 Barsky v. U. S., 167 F2d 241 (C.A.D.C., 1948); cert. den., 334 U. S. 843
(1948).
( 103 U. S. 168 (1881).
"McGeary, The Congressional Power of Itvestigation, 28 NEiRASK.]- L. Ri:v.
516 (1949).
11U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953); the criticism is stated to include
FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME CouuT, 332-34, Landis, op. cit.
supra note 3; the inroads are stated to have been made by McGrain v. Daugher-
ty, 273 U. S. 135,.170, 171, (1927) and Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
""Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
49U. S. v. Emspack, 95 F Supp. 1010 (D.C., D.C. 1951).
'Harvey O'Connor, cited by the U. S. Senate July 23, 1953 and indicted by
federal grand jury October 16, 1953.
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chanical interpretation of the First Amendment." 51 Another wit-
ness refused to answer because of the First Amendment and ad-
vice of Dr. Albert Einstein.
5 2
The "clear and present danger" tests used to evaluate legisla-
tion under the First Amendment are patently inapplicable to Con-
gressional investigations to determine whether allegedly sub-
versive movements constitute a danger either to the security of the
nation or to its very existence.
Fourth Amendment
The operation of a Congressional investigation is subject to
the "unreasonable searches and seizures" provision of the Fourth
Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.53 Injunctions have been
granted on the basis of this provision. 4 Subpoenas which are un-
reasonably broad and vague may violate this Amendment. The
validity of questions relating to stock transactions of a member of
the Senate has been upheld.
56
Fifth Amendment
A witness before a Congressional committee may refuse to
answer questions on the grounds of the privilege against self-in-
crimination which is contained in the Fifth Amendment.5 7 Im-
munity from prosecution based on the Fifth Amendment is granted
only when the Constitutional privilege is asserted. 57 Moreover,
the immunity extends only to the specific testimony made, and
not to evidence discovered as a result of the testimony. The testi-
mony of a witness before a Congressional committee may be in-
troduced in a contempt prosecution based on the testimony despite
the fact that a literal reading of the statute might lead to the oppo-
site conclusion. 58
" Nutting, Freedoom of Silence, 47 MicH. L. REV. 181 (1948). Nutting con-
tends that we should assume that "freedom of silence" is a liberty protected by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, which does not necessarily
have the same content as the free speech portion of the First Amendment.
" Albert Shadowitz. See New York Times, Dec. 17, 1953, p. 1. The witness
was cited for contempt August 16, 1954. 100 Congressional Record 13935 (Daily
Edition).
" U. S. CONST., Amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
" Strawn v. Western Union, Eq. 60 814-36, Sup. Ct., D.C., unreported (1936).
The case is discussed further in note 78 below.
I Such a holding re administrative agencies will be found in F.T.C. v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924). See also Oklahoma Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S. 186 at 209 (1946).
In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897).
5 U. S. CONST., Amend. V. ". . . nor shall any person be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . ."
61T May v. U. S., 175 F2d 994 (C.A.D.C.), cert. den. 338 U. S. 830 (1949).
"U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950); U. S. v. Fleischman, 339 U. S. 349
(1950); Barsky v. U. S., 167 F2d 241 (C.A.D.C.), cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
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Congress may meet refusals to testify by a grant of immunity
to witnesses, who must then testify.59 Congress has seen fit to en-
act a statute giving a degree of immunity to persons testifying be-
fore Congressional committees. 60 The statute extends its protec-
tion to witnesses whether or not they claim the Constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, and it applies in state courts
as well as federal.6 ' The present statute does not give witnesses
complete immunity from prosecution, and thus is not broad enough
for Congress to be able to compel witnesses to give self-incriminat-
ing testimony.
6 2
The Supreme Court has held that witnesses before federal
grand juries may refuse to answer questions dealing with Com-
munist party activities on the grounds that the answers might
tend to incriminate the witness.6 3 The same privilege extends to
testimony before Congressional committees.
6 4
There has been no reported adjudication of the question of
whether a Congressional investigating committee may deny the
claim of privilege where the possibility of incrimination is without
substance. In judicial proceedings, the court has the power to
make such a determination.6 5
The resolution creating one committee has been upheld as
against an attack that it violated the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment as setting up no recognizable standards for the
scope of the committee or for its conduct.6 6 The due process clause
has produced much litigation concerning the validity of the end
products of the legislative process, laws themselves. Strangely
enough, it has not often been relied on as grounds for attack on the
intermediate steps in the legislative process. If it were seized upon
by the courts as a device to increase the scope of judicial review of
the investigating power of Congress, the result might well be a
considerable disturbance in the existing equilibrium among the
branches of government.
5Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
611 Stat. 156 (1857), as amended 12 Stat. 333 (1862), as codified, Rev.
Stat. §859 (1875), as amended, 52 Stat. 943 (1938), as amended 62 Stat. 833, 18
U.S.C. §3486. The section reads as follows: Testimony before Congress: Im-
munity. "No testimony given by a witness before either House, or before any
Committee of either House, or before any joint committee established by a
joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, shall be used as
evidence in any criminal proceedings against him in any court, except in a
prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony. But an official
paper or record produced by him is not within the said privilege."
"Adams v. Maryland, - U. S. -, 98 L. Ed. 360 (1954).
0 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
63Blau v. U. S., 340 U. S. 159 (1950).
"U. S. v. Nelson (D.C., D.C.), 103 F. Supp. 215 (1952).
"Mason v. U. S., 244 U. S. 362 (1917).
"U. S. v. Dennis, 72 F. Supp. 417, (D.C., D.C. 1947), aff'd 171 F2d 986





The provisions of the Sixth Amendment 67 have no direct ap-
plication to Congressional investigations, since such proceedings
are not criminal prosecutions. It has been asserted, however, that
the Amendment applies to all cases where a person is "put on
trial," whether the proceeding be strictly criminal or not, and that
therefore "vagueness in a resolution authorizing an investigation
is objectionable under the Sixth Amendment where an attempt
is made to put one 'on trial' under it." 68 In the unlikely event of a
judicial holding along these lines, a witness before a Congressional
Committee would, under certain circumstances, be entitled to (1)
be informed of the nature of the "accusation"; (2) be confronted
with witnesses against him; (3) have compulsory process for ob-
taining witnesses in his favor; and (4) have the assistance of
counsel.
OTHER CHALLENGES TO THE CONGRESSIONAL
POWER OF INVESTIGATION
False Testimony
Perjury before a Congressional committee is a federal crime,
a violation of the U. S. Code. 69 If the offense is committed within
the District of Columbia, the prosecution may be brought under
the District Code,7 0 which provides a greater penalty that the U. S.
Code.
Before a conviction for perjury for false testimony before a
Congressional committee may be sustained, it must appear that a
quorum was present when the offense was committed, for the
perjury must be before a "competent tribunal."7 ' What consti-
tutes a "quorum" is a matter for the Congress itself to decide.
7 2
The fact that the false statements complained of were subsequently
" "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
Counsel for his defense."
"Boudin, op cit. supra note 38.
62 Stat. 773, 18 U.S.C. §1621.
" D. C. Code § 22-2501.
" Christof'el v. U. S., 338 U. S. 84 (1949). This decision has been stated to
open up "a veritable Pandora's box of new implications of vastly extended ju-
dicial supervision and control over every step of the legislative process"
because the court "[held] that (1) the status of a standing committee of the
House of Representatives as a 'competent tribunal' within the meaning of the
District of Columbia perjury statute, and (2) the integrity of the committee's
records as to the presence of a quorum, could be impeached by parol evi-
dence ..." Morgan, op. cit. supra note 34a.
The Christoffel case is discussed in a note Absence of Committee Quorum
as Defense to Perjury Charge, 49 CoL. L. REv. 1007 (1949).




retracted does not prevent prosecution for perjury.7 2" In a perjury
prosecution, the question of materiality of testimony is for the
court.73
The "competent tribunal" test goes to the question of Com-
mittee jurisdiction. On this subject, the current controversy be-
tween the Department of the Army and the chairman of the Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on
Government Operations presents a new problem. If perjury prose-
cutions are instituted, the question will arise as to whether the
committee had the power to investigate the relationship between
its staff and an executive department.7 4 However, the Legislative
Reference Service of the Library of Congress, which members
of congress frequently consult for advice as to the status of the
law, is of the opinion that it is very difficult "to attack successfully
the jurisdiction of Congressional Committees. 7 :
Suits for Injunctive Relief
The Congressional investigating power is sometimes chal-
lenged by civil suits for injunctions filed against the Committee
chairman, members of the committee staff, or persons in possession
of papers subpoenaed by a committee. Such attacks are, almost
without exception, unsuccessful. The judicial branch of our gov-
ernment is reluctant to inject itself into the legislative process.
A recent effort to enjoin a committee chairman, Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy, from forcing persons to produce documents in
12, U. S. v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564 (1937).
,3U. S. v. Weber, 197 F2d 237 (C. A. 2d, 1952); cert. den. 344 U. S. 834
(1952).
"4 See debate in the U. S. Senate between Senators Ellender and McCarthy,
February 2, 1954, and memo of the Library of Congress there set forth, 100
Congressional Record 1048 (Daily Edition). The jurisdiction of the Committee
is fixed by statute as follows:
(g) (1) Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department, to con-
sist of 13 Senators, to which committee shall be referred all proposed legisla-
tion, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the follow-
ing subjects:
(A) Budget and accounting measures, other than appropriations.
(B) Reorganizations to the executive branch of the Government.
(2) Such committee shall have the duty of-
(A) Receiving and examining reports of the Comptroller General
of the United States and of submitting such recommendations to the
Senate as it deems necessary or desirable in connection with the sub-
ject matter of such reports;
(B) studying the operation of Government activities at all levels
with a view to determining its economy and efficiency;
(C) evaluating the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legis-
lative and executive branches of the Government;
(D) studying the intergovernmental relationships between the
United States and the States and municipalities, and between the
United States and international organizations of which the United
States is a member. (Committee name changed by S. Res. 280, 82d
Cong.)
Extension of Remarks of Hon. John W. McCormack, D., Mass., January
20, 1954, 100 Congressional Record A412 (Daily Edition), setting forth the text
of a memorandum prepared by the Service.
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their possession relating to loyalty board proceedings failed in the
federal courts."; Similarly, a suit for an injunction filed against
employees of the House Select Committee on Lobbying Activities
failed in 1950.77
An injunction was issued in 1936 against the Western Union
Telegraph Company and others on the complaint of Silas H. Strawn
and others by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
7 8
The importance of this decision is somewhat lessened by the fact
that it was by a federal court of initial jurisdiction only, and the
defendant was neither a committee of Congress nor its members.
This decision has been described as moving "against the current
of court approval of investigations,"7 9 and doubt has been expressed
1 Fischler and Saltznan v. McCarthy, U. S. District Court, S.D. N.Y., Civ.
90-20. The opinion of I. R. Kaufman, D.J. noted that proper venue was in the
District of Columbia, no jurisdictional amount was established as required by
28 U.S.C. §1331, and that the type of question presented and the nature of the
relief sought was beyond the purview of the Judicial Branch of the Government.
" Committee for Constitutional Government and Edward A. Rumely v.
Louis Little et. al., D.C., D.C., No. 2300-50.
' Strawn et. al. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. et. al., unreported (D.C.
Sup. Ct., 1936) Eq. 60814-36. See 3 U. S. LAW WEEK 646, New York Times,
March 12, 193'6, p. 1. Plaintiffs were members of a Chicago law firm. De-
fendants had in their possession copies of telegrams which they had transmitted
for plaintiffs. A Senate lobby investigating committee subpoenaed the copies of
all telegrams, sent paid and/or received collect between the dates of February
1 and December 1, 1934, and charged to Winston Strawn and Shaw, First Na-
tional Bank Building, Chicago, Illinois, and all of its associates and subsidi-
aries, and all of their known officers, employees, and agents. It is worthy of
note that the subpoena did not restrict itself to copies of telegrams sent to or
received from specific persons, or to telegrams relating to legislation in some
way. Plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that many of the wires were privileged
communications between attorney and client, and husband and wife. Plaintiffs
alleged a contractual agreement with defendants providing for non-disclosure
and set out Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §605)
and Sections 7 and 7a of Chgs. 134, Illinois Revised Statutes, both of which re-
late to the secrecy of telegraph messages. Plaintiffs further alleged that the
resolutions creating the Senate Committee violated the Fourth. Fifth, and
Tenth Amendments, and that the subpoena issued by the Committee went be-
yond the scope authorized by the resolutions, were insufficient and improper in
form and substance, and violated the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. A
temporary restraining order was issued March 2, 1936, the day that the com-
plaint was filed. A preliminary injunction was issued by Chief Justice Wheat on
March 11, 1936. The court stated that the subpoena was so broad that obedience
to it would result in "unreasonable and unlawful disclosure of telegrams which
are privileged and confidential communications between . . . attorneys . . .
and . . . clients . . . as to which the privilege has not been waived . . . (and
other private communications between friends, members of families, etc.) in-
cluding privileged and confidential communications between husband and
wife ..." The court also stated that the subpoena "is too broad and inclusive,
is improper in form and substance, and . . .enforcement ... would be contrary
to and in violation of prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures
contained in the 4th Amendment." After hearing on June 25, 1936, a permanent
injunction was granted by Chief Justice Wheat. The reasons set out by the
court were the same as those set out in the preliminary injunction. The above
details have been set forth because the decision, though frequently cited by
persons seeking to block Congressional investigations, has never been reported.
" McGeary, op. cit. supra note 46 at 522.
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that the United States Supreme Court would uphold such a de-
cision.80 One of the present Justices of the Supreme Court was
chairman of the Congressional committee involved in the Strawn
case, and his views have been stated thus:
Mr. McAdoo. "I think the dignity, as well as the
power, of this body are such that when the Senate under-
takes an investigation no court has the power to interfere
with the processes of the Senate."
Mr. Black. "I agree with the Senator fully."" '
Contempt
The most frequent challenge to the investigative power is by
contemptuous conduct. The right of Congress to provide punish-
ment for contempt was upheld by the judiciary early in our his-
tory. 2 Contempt power as to members is given to the House and
Senate by the U. S. Constitution.8 3 Contempt power as to non-
members was discussed at the Constitutional Convention, but no
action was taken.34 Specific grant of such power was unnecessary
in view of the general recognition of the power in the British Par-
liament and in colonial legislatures.8 5
The contempt may be of a house of Congress itself, or of one
of its committees. Either type is punishable. The contempt may be
tried by the house of Congress itself, or it may be referred to the
United States Attorney for prosecution under 2 U.S.C. §192.86 The
referral to the appropriate United States Attorney is specifically
provided for by statute.8 7 Prosecution and conviction under one
procedure does not preclude subsequent conviction under the
other.8 8
' Ehrmann, op. cit. supra note 18 at 134.
"80 Cong. Rec. 3329 (1936). See also Hearst V. Black, 87 F2d 68 (C.A.D.C.
1936), where the judicial branch of government held that it was without power
to restrain a Senate committee from use of documents obtained illegally.
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204, (1821).
U. S. CONST., Art. I, §5.
"For a review of colonial and early state precedents, see Potts, op. cit.
supra note 3.
See 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention 341.
31 The text of §192 is set forth in footnote 10 above.
52 Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. §194. Witnesses failing to testify or produce records.
"Whenever a witness summoned as mentioned in section 192 fails to appear to
testify or fails to produce any books, papers, records, or documents, as required,
or whenever any witness so summoned refuses to answer any question perti-
-nent to the subject under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress,
or any committee or subcommittee of either House of Congress, and the fact
of such failure or failures is reported to either House while Congress is in
session, or when Congress is not in session, a statement of fact constituting
such failure is reported to and filed with the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House, it shall be the duty of the said President of the Senate
or Speaker of the House, as the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify,
the statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of the Senate or House. as the
case may be, to the appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be
to bring the matter before the grand jury for its action."
"In re Chapman, 166 U. S. 661 (1897).
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Adjudications of contempt by one of the houses of Congress
itself occur much less frequently than referral to federal attorneys
for prosecution under the U. S. Code.8 9 Upon direct adjudication
by the branch of Congress itself, the person held in contempt may
be imprisoned for the remainder of the legislative session during
which he was convicted.90
The amount of judicial review which is possible varies con-
siderably in the two methods dealing with contempts. Where the
trial and adjudication are by the house of Congress itself, the court
is dealing with a legislative determination. On the other hand,
when a case comes before the judiciary after prosecution under
2 U.S.C. §192, the court's function is much more extensive. In such
cases it may consider whether the inquiry was authorized by and
pertinent to the committee's grant of existence. 91 The courts may
thus free persons voted in contempt by a committee and referred
by the Congress to the federal prosecutor without passing directly
on the power of Congress to investigate.
Contempt of Congress may consist of any one of a variety of
actions: failure to appear, refusal to be sworn, refusal to testify,
refusal to produce papers subpoenaed, or bribery of members. A
refusal to appear or to give information may be based on the
ground that the committee lacks jurisdiction to conduct the entire
investigation, or merely that it has not the authority to ask a spe-
cific question.
A refusal to be sworn as a witness is a refusal to testify.9 2
This is so even if the witness expresses willingness to testify but
insists first on the right to make objection to Committee pro-
cedure.9 3 A person who voluntarily appears before a committee is
guilty of contempt if he thereafter refuses to testify.9 4 Even a
person brought before a committee involuntarily by force must
testify.9 5
Failure to answer questions before Congressional committees
is a violation of U. S. Code, §192, but only if the questions are
pertinent.9 6 The pertinency of questions is a matter of law which
the court decides,97 but under certain circumstances it may be nec-
19Instances of direct adjudication by Congress of contempt include: Ander-
son v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204 (1821); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1881);
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135,
169 (1927); Barry v. U. S. ex. rel. Cunningham, 279 U. S. 597 (1929) ; Jurney v.
MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935).
"Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U. S. 204 (1821).
9U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953).
2U. S. v. Josephson, 165 F2d 82 (C.A.2d, 1947), cert. den. 333 U. S. 838
(1948).
93Eisler v. U. S., 170 F2d 273 (C.A., D.C. 1948), cert. granted 335 U. S. 857
(1948), dismissed, 338 U. S. 883 (1949).
1
4 Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
1Eisler v. U. S., 170 F2d 273, 279 (C.A.D.C. 1948) ; cert. granted, 335 U. S.
857 (1948); dismissed, 338 U. S. 883 (1949).
"Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
"Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
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essary to plead and show pertinency.98 It has been asserted that the
limitation of pertinence "has been reduced to almost complete in-
significance." 99 The witness who doubts that the question is perti-.
nent acts at his peril if he refuses to answer. Vindication may
come, if at all, only after citation by the Congressional committee,
citation by the house of Congress, indictment, trial, appeal to an.
intermediate appellate court, and finally determination by the U. S.
Supreme Court. This can be an expensive proposition, and it pre-
sents practical objections to refusing to answer on the grounds that
the question is not pertinent.
The questions which an investigating committee of Congress
poses may cause an individual inconvenience, embarrassment, or
even substantial financial loss. Ridicule, social ostracism, economic
boycott-all may face the witness, and yet he must answer. The
public good and the general public interest has been weighed against
the cost to the individual, and, at the moment, the decision is that
the public interest is paramount, and will be served by disclosure.
A witness's good faith and honest belief that he is not legally
required to answer is no defense to a prosecution under §192.100
The elements of bad faith or evil purpose need not be present to
constitute "willful default."''1 Evidence that the witness refused to
answer because of advice of counsel is properly excluded. 10 2 The
lawyer-client privilege against disclosure is inapplicable to Con-
gressional investigations 10 3 and is therefore no grounds for refusal
by a lawyer to testify.
A witness may not refuse to testify on ground that his "right
of privacy" is invaded. 10 4 However, where the presence of tele-
vision and newsreel cameras disturbs a witness, refusal to testify
may not be contempt.1 5 Also, where a Congressional committee
holds open hearings, the attendant publicity may be such that
criminal prosecutions of persons mentioned in the hearings will
have to be postponed in order to assure a trial free of hostile at-
mosphere and public preconception of defendant's guilt.106
Witnesses have from time to time refused to answer on the
ground that the replies will render them infamous, degrade them,
disgrace, or humiliate them. There is no legal basis for refusal on
'Bowers v. U. S., 202 F2d 447 (C.A.D.C. 1953).
Driver, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Punish
Contempts of Its Investigating Committees, 38 VA. L. REV. 887 and 1011, at
1019 (1952).
Im Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263 (1929).
101 Fields v. U. S., 164 F2d 97 (C.A.D.C. 1947), cert. den. 332 U. S. 851 (1948).
'"-Dennis v. U. S., 171 F2d 986 (C.A.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 339 U. S. 162 (1950).
103 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U. S. 125 (1935).
104 See note, "Rights of Witnesses before Congressional Investigating Com-
mittees, 35 MARQ. L. REV. 282 (1952).
01 U. S. v. Kleinman, 107 F Supp. 407 (D.C., D.C. 1952). For arguments in
favor of televising committee hearings, see "Rights of Witnesses before Con-
gressional Investigating Committees," 35 MARQ. L. REV. 282 (1952), which cites,
inter alia, Senator Kefauver's arguments at 97 Cong. Rec. 9995 et seq.
1 See Delaney v. U. S., 199 F2d 107, (C.A., 1st, 1952).
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;these grounds. 10 7 On the contrary, the statutes expressly provide
otherwise. 0 8
A witness may attack the vagueness of the resolution creating
the committee before which he appears. Resolutions creating se-
lect committees, and statutes creating standing committees, how-
ever, provide no criminal sanctions in themselves and should not,
therefore, be construed as criminal statutes. Attacks on authorizing
resolutions are almost uniformly unsuccessful. 10 9 No witness has
successfully attacked a contempt citation on the ground that the
investigating committee was illegally constituted. 110 Nor is the fact
that a judicial proceeding is pending, based on the same facts, valid
grounds for refusal to testify."'
It has been shown above that once a person has been brought
before a Congressional Committee, the manner of his coming is
immaterial. However, a witness who refuses to appear may contest
the validity of the subpoena which compelled his attendance. 112 A
Congressional subpoena binds all persons served within the borders
of the United States, citizens or not,113 and inadequacy of service
of the subpoena is not sufficient grounds for a court to upset a con-
tempt adjudication. 114 A witness must produce subpoenaed docu-
ments if physically possible. 115 If a witness appears and refuses to
be sworn or to testify at all, he may not thereafter attack the
validity of the subpoena which brought him before the commit-
tee." '6 A witness who refuses to produce subpoenaed records may
not at a later date contest a finding to that effect by alleging the
absence of a quorum of the committee on the return date.
117
A special situation exists where a Congressional committee
"Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); U. S. v. Thomas, 49 F. Supp.
547 (D.C., W.D. Ky., 1943).
10 §193. Privilege of witnesses. "No witness is privileged to refuse to testify
to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting which he shall be examined by
either House of Congress, or by any joint committee established by a joint or
concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or by any committee of
either House, upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his produc-
tion of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous."
52 Stat. 942, 2 U.S.C. §193.
"9But see U. S. v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41 (1953) where the court adopted a
narrow and unrealistic definition of the term "lobbying," possibly because of
an inability to find general agreement among its members as to the substantive
questions involved.
1o Such attacks have been made. See Dennis v. U. S., 171 F2d 986 (C.A.D.C.
1948), aff'd 339 U. S. 162 (1950), re-hearing denied, 339 U. S. 950 (1950).
"I Sinclair v. U. S., 279 U. S. 263, 295 (1929).
1 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
"' Eisler v. U. S., 170 F2d 273 (C.A.D.C. 1948) ; cert. granted, 335 U. S. 857
(1948); dismissed, 338 U. S. 883 (1949).
114McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 155 (1927).
"' Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 374-76 (1911); Barsky v. U. S., 167 F2d
241, 251 (C.A.D.C. 1947), cert. den. 334 U. S. 843 (1948).
..U. S. v. Josephson, 165 F2d 82 (C.A., 2d, 1947), cert. den., 333 U. S. 838
(1948); rehearing den. 333 U. S. 858 (1948); rehearing den. 335 U. S. 899
(1948).
II- U. S. v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323 (1950) ; rehearing den., 339 U. S. 991 (1950).
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attempts to subpoena papers from the Executive branch. One of
the principal obstacles in the path of Congressional investigations
of the Executive branch of the government has always been the
position of the latter that Congress cannot compel it to produce
executive documents if the President deems their production in-
compatible with the public interest. 1 8 The Legislative branch has
never succeeded in any pitched battle on this subject. At times the
Executive acquiesces in the request, with or without the pressure
of the Legislature's "power of the purse." At other times he stands
fast and accumulates new precedents for succeeding administra-
tions.
The publication of a defamatory letter reflecting on the con-
duct of an investigation has been held not to constitute contempt. 119
Any open interference with the orderly procedure of a committee
hearing can be held to be contempt.
1 20
The Congressional investigating power may be challenged
inferentially by civil suit for false imprisonment by a person held
in contempt,12' or by a writ of habeas corpus brought to discharge a
person held in confinement for contempt.
12
PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Much has been written on possible changes in the procedure of
Congressional investigating committees. 23 Changes have been pro-
posed by members of Congress themselves 24 as well as by law re-
view writers125 and others.1 26 One individual went so far as to in-
"'For the position of the executive branch see Wolkinson, Demands of
Congressional Committees for Executive Papers, 10 FED. B. J. 103 (1949). Com-
pare the attitude of the legislative branch set forth in Memorandum on Pro-
ceedings Involving Contempt of Congress and Its Committees, U. S. Senate Ju-
diciary Committee, Committee print, 80th Congress, 2d Session, January 6,
1947.
"'Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917).
'"Landis, op. cit. supra note 3.
mKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168 (1880).
'm Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521 (1917); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294
U. S. 125 (1935).
11See Garrison, Congressional Investigations: Are They a Threat to Civil
Liberties? 40 A.B.A.J. 125 (February, 1954). The same article appears at 100
Congressional Record A1097 (Daily Edition).
IN See Senator Lucas' S. Con. Res. 2, 95 Cong. Rec. 60 (1949); Representa-
tive Buchanan's H. Res. 824, and Representative Holifield's H. Con. Res. 4, all
made in the 81st Congress, 1st Session; Representative Heller's H. Con. Res.
186, 83d Congress, discussed at 100 Cong. Rec. A29 (Daily Edition); and Sena-
tors Morse and Lehman's S. Con. Res. 64, 83d Congress. See also U. S. District
Judge Charles E. Wyzanski's proposals at 3 REcoRD OF THE BAR AssocIATion OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK 93, reprinted at 94 Cong. Rec. A1547.
"2 See Congressional Investigations-Salvation in Self Regulation, 38 GEORG.
L. J. 343, at 363, which sets forth a proposed "Tentative Draft of Suggested Com-
mittee Rules."
12OSee the 7 proposals of Dean Erwin N. Griswold of the Harvard Law
School, New York Times, March 25, 1954, p. 20, c. 4, and discussion thereof by
Arthur Krock at p. 28, c. 5. See also statement in behalf of the Bar Association
of the District of Columbia before a special subcommittee of the Rules Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives, set forth at 100 Cong. Record A5306 (Daily
Edition), August 3, 1953.
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sert an advertisement in a newspaper noting that a petition was
being circulated urging the Piesident to "use his influence to the
ends that Congressional investigations shall be governed by recog-
nized legal principles and procedures."' 27 It has even been sug-
gested that a committee be established to review witnesses' claims
of exemption from giving testimony.'
28
For an excellent analysis of proposed procedural rules for
committees pending in 1.949, see Meader, Limitations on Congres-
sional Investigations.'29 The author, former counsel of the Senate
War Investigating Committee and presently a member of the
House, contends that no general procedural rules should be en-
acted.
The hue and cry for procedural changes are caused by the un-
restrained conduct of a few legislators who, interested solely in in-
creasing their personal power and notoriety, engage in reckless and
irresponsible headline hunting with wild charges, unfounded ac-
cusations, etc. Such persons would probably ignore new procedural
rules even as they now ignore laws of committee jurisdiction and
the standards of fair play and good taste already established by
tradition. The rules would, however, be obeyed by the bulk of the
legislators, and would constitute a serious handicap to the ac-
complishment of the tasks of Congress.
The legislative process is bigger than any one legislator, and
extreme care should be taken lest changes designed to confine one
demagogue wreak havoc on the entire process.
CONCLUSION
The Congressional investigating power is an essential part of
the legislative process and plays an important role in our tri-
partite system of government. The power is broad, and necessarily
so. The limitations are few, and necessarily so. Our entire system of
government should not be changed because the actions of a few out-
rage the public sense of decency. The public's desires should be di-
rected toward its own selected representatives who have it within
their power to restore the legislative investigation to a position of
respect in the community.
We must not lose sight of the importance of the doctrine of
separation of powers in our government. The investigating power
of Congress is, at present, functioning almost exclusively through
committees which are delegated authority by the two houses of
Congress. These committees stand in the place of the Senate and
the House. If the Senate or House itself chose to investigate a par-
ticular subject, went into plenary session, and began subpoenaing
witnesses without any public statement as to its objectives, the in-
appropriateness of interference by the Executive or Judicial branch
" New York Times, February 21, 1954, Sec. 4, p. 6.
'28 Congressional Investigations: A Plan for Legislative Review, 40 A.B.A.J.
191 (March, 1954).
" 47 Mich. L. Rev. 775 (1949).
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at this incubation stage in the legislative process would be apparent.
Later, the Executive might veto the bill which resulted from
the investigation, or the Judiciary might hold the law unconstitu-
tional. It is submitted that neither branch has any legitimate role
to fulfill at the formative stage described above.
Much of the confusion on the subject of the Congressional in-
vestigation stems from the fact that many Americans have, er-
roneously, become convinced that witnesses before hostile commit-
tees are "on trial." Therefore, their sense of fair play demands: let
the witness be faced by his accuser, let him have the opportunity
to cross-examine other witnesses, etc. This is no less a perversion
of the function of the legislative investigation than that of the
headline hunting chairman who arouses the justifiable ire of the
public. The investigating power is a part of the fact-finding process
which is essential to intelligent law-making. Stripped of its broad
investigating power, Congress would be unaware of the nation's
needs, and the dangers to its existence. In such event, the America
we know would not long endure.
"It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guard-
ians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a
a degree as the courts.' 8 °
No one is useless in the world who lightens the burden of it
for anyone else.-Charles Dickens.
" Holmes, J., in M.K. and T. Railway v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 270 (1904).
Your contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation today
will still be promoting a better administration of justice in
Colorado for generations to come. The corpus of funds which
the Foundation acquires cannot be invaded. Name the Colo-
rado Bar Foundation in your Will. Mail your contribution
today to the Colorado Bar Foundation, 702 Midland Savings
Building, Denver 2, Colorado.
165 Gar Pl Ta 550
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